Initial pre-release

tmux-party: share a tmux session with people on the same UNIX host.
Single-file POSIX shell (party) with a filesystem + tmux server-access
trust model. See README.md.

tests/50-host.bats

@@ -0,0 +1,92 @@
+#!/usr/bin/env bats
+
+load 'helpers'
+
+setup() {
+  setup_party_sandbox
+  require_party_group     # need real group membership for chgrp
+}
+
+teardown() { teardown_party_sandbox; }
+
+# Per-party roster path: ${PARTY_SOCKET_DIR}/party-${USER}:${NAME}.d/roster.
+party_rec() { printf '%s/party-%s:%s.d/roster\n' "$PARTY_SOCKET_DIR" "$USER" "$1"; }
+
+@test "party host <name> creates a roster record and a live tmux server" {
+  run "$PARTY_BIN" host smoke
+  [ "$status" -eq 0 ]
+  [[ "$output" == *"smoke"* ]]
+  rec=$(party_rec smoke)
+  [ -f "$rec" ]
+  grep -q "^PARTY_NAME=smoke$"    "$rec"
+  grep -q "^HOST_USER=$USER$"     "$rec"
+  ! grep -q "^MODE="              "$rec"
+  ! grep -q "^OPS="               "$rec"
+  pid=$(awk -F= '$1=="SERVER_PID"{print $2}' "$rec")
+  kill -0 "$pid"
+  sock=$(awk -F= '$1=="SOCKET"{print $2}' "$rec")
+  [ -S "$sock" ]
+  tmux -S "$sock" has-session -t smoke
+}
+
+@test "party host enforces unique party name" {
+  "$PARTY_BIN" host dupe
+  run "$PARTY_BIN" host dupe
+  [ "$status" -ne 0 ]
+  [[ "$output" == *"already running"* ]]
+}
+
+@test "party host rejects bad names" {
+  run "$PARTY_BIN" host "../escape"
+  [ "$status" -ne 0 ]
+}
+
+@test "party host without name uses a default" {
+  run "$PARTY_BIN" host
+  [ "$status" -eq 0 ]
+  ls -d "$PARTY_SOCKET_DIR"/party-"$USER":*.d >/dev/null
+}
+
+@test "party host puts host on access list with write" {
+  "$PARTY_BIN" host acl
+  rec=$(party_rec acl)
+  sock=$(awk -F= '$1=="SOCKET"{print $2}' "$rec")
+  tmux -S "$sock" server-access -l | grep -q "^$USER"
+}
+
+@test "party close kills the server and removes the roster record" {
+  "$PARTY_BIN" host clo
+  rec=$(party_rec clo)
+  sock=$(awk -F= '$1=="SOCKET"{print $2}' "$rec")
+  pid=$(awk -F= '$1=="SERVER_PID"{print $2}' "$rec")
+
+  run "$PARTY_BIN" close clo
+  [ "$status" -eq 0 ]
+  [ ! -f "$rec" ]
+  ! kill -0 "$pid" 2>/dev/null
+  [ ! -S "$sock" ]
+}
+
+@test "party close rejects bad names" {
+  # Previous incarnation of this test edited HOST_USER in the roster
+  # file and expected close to refuse. That's no longer the trust
+  # model — host identity is anchored on dir ownership, not file
+  # content (commit 94befac), so editing HOST_USER is a no-op.
+  # The "not the host" path now tests as: another user owns the dir,
+  # which we can't fake without root. Coverage for the symlink and
+  # forged-field cases lives in tests/95-stub-roundtrip.bats. What we
+  # add here is parity with `party host rejects bad names`: cmd_close
+  # validates the name before any path or filesystem work.
+  run "$PARTY_BIN" close "../escape"
+  [ "$status" -ne 0 ]
+}
+
+@test "party host puts only the host on the access list (no auto-population)" {
+  "$PARTY_BIN" host inv
+  rec=$(party_rec inv)
+  sock=$(awk -F= '$1=="SOCKET"{print $2}' "$rec")
+  count=$(tmux -S "$sock" server-access -l | wc -l)
+  [ "$count" -eq 1 ]
+  "$PARTY_BIN" close inv
+}
+