veg
6be0ac1877
tmux-party: share a tmux session with people on the same UNIX host. Single-file POSIX shell (party) with a filesystem + tmux server-access trust model. See README.md.
92 lines
2.8 KiB
Bash
92 lines
2.8 KiB
Bash
#!/usr/bin/env bats
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load 'helpers'
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setup() {
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setup_party_sandbox
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require_party_group # need real group membership for chgrp
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}
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teardown() { teardown_party_sandbox; }
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# Per-party roster path: ${PARTY_SOCKET_DIR}/party-${USER}:${NAME}.d/roster.
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party_rec() { printf '%s/party-%s:%s.d/roster\n' "$PARTY_SOCKET_DIR" "$USER" "$1"; }
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@test "party host <name> creates a roster record and a live tmux server" {
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run "$PARTY_BIN" host smoke
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[ "$status" -eq 0 ]
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[[ "$output" == *"smoke"* ]]
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rec=$(party_rec smoke)
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[ -f "$rec" ]
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grep -q "^PARTY_NAME=smoke$" "$rec"
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grep -q "^HOST_USER=$USER$" "$rec"
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! grep -q "^MODE=" "$rec"
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! grep -q "^OPS=" "$rec"
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pid=$(awk -F= '$1=="SERVER_PID"{print $2}' "$rec")
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kill -0 "$pid"
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sock=$(awk -F= '$1=="SOCKET"{print $2}' "$rec")
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[ -S "$sock" ]
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tmux -S "$sock" has-session -t smoke
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}
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@test "party host enforces unique party name" {
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"$PARTY_BIN" host dupe
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run "$PARTY_BIN" host dupe
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[ "$status" -ne 0 ]
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[[ "$output" == *"already running"* ]]
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}
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@test "party host rejects bad names" {
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run "$PARTY_BIN" host "../escape"
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[ "$status" -ne 0 ]
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}
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@test "party host without name uses a default" {
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run "$PARTY_BIN" host
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[ "$status" -eq 0 ]
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ls -d "$PARTY_SOCKET_DIR"/party-"$USER":*.d >/dev/null
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}
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@test "party host puts host on access list with write" {
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"$PARTY_BIN" host acl
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rec=$(party_rec acl)
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sock=$(awk -F= '$1=="SOCKET"{print $2}' "$rec")
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tmux -S "$sock" server-access -l | grep -q "^$USER"
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}
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@test "party close kills the server and removes the roster record" {
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"$PARTY_BIN" host clo
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rec=$(party_rec clo)
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sock=$(awk -F= '$1=="SOCKET"{print $2}' "$rec")
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pid=$(awk -F= '$1=="SERVER_PID"{print $2}' "$rec")
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run "$PARTY_BIN" close clo
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[ "$status" -eq 0 ]
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[ ! -f "$rec" ]
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! kill -0 "$pid" 2>/dev/null
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[ ! -S "$sock" ]
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}
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@test "party close rejects bad names" {
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# Previous incarnation of this test edited HOST_USER in the roster
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# file and expected close to refuse. That's no longer the trust
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# model — host identity is anchored on dir ownership, not file
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# content (commit 94befac), so editing HOST_USER is a no-op.
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# The "not the host" path now tests as: another user owns the dir,
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# which we can't fake without root. Coverage for the symlink and
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# forged-field cases lives in tests/95-stub-roundtrip.bats. What we
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# add here is parity with `party host rejects bad names`: cmd_close
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# validates the name before any path or filesystem work.
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run "$PARTY_BIN" close "../escape"
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[ "$status" -ne 0 ]
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}
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@test "party host puts only the host on the access list (no auto-population)" {
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"$PARTY_BIN" host inv
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rec=$(party_rec inv)
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sock=$(awk -F= '$1=="SOCKET"{print $2}' "$rec")
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count=$(tmux -S "$sock" server-access -l | wc -l)
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[ "$count" -eq 1 ]
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"$PARTY_BIN" close inv
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}
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