docs: state the accidents-not-adversaries threat model; add ROADMAP
The gates in front of destructive operations exist to stop mistakes (stale rosters, typos, racing hosts); stopping a malicious group member is a side effect, not the design goal. Written into README §Security and the man page so future checks are judged by that bar. ROADMAP.md captures the direction: social features (knock, log, clean) over further hardening, plus the explicit resist list.
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@ -356,6 +356,16 @@ A group member who plants a forged directory cannot fake its
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ownership, cannot redirect the socket path, and cannot forge a socket
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elsewhere.
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.Pp
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The threat model is accidents, not adversaries.
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The ownership and symlink gates in front of destructive operations
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exist so a stale roster, a typo, or two racing
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.Cm host
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invocations cannot remove or hijack the wrong directory; that they
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would also stop a malicious group member is a side effect, not the
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design goal.
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New checks should prevent a plausible mistake, not a hypothetical
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attack from a friend.
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.Pp
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.Nm
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is designed for small, mutually trusted groups: a hacklab, a tech
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team, a circle of friends, not strangers across the internet.
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