docs: state the accidents-not-adversaries threat model; add ROADMAP

The gates in front of destructive operations exist to stop mistakes
(stale rosters, typos, racing hosts); stopping a malicious group
member is a side effect, not the design goal. Written into README
§Security and the man page so future checks are judged by that bar.
ROADMAP.md captures the direction: social features (knock, log,
clean) over further hardening, plus the explicit resist list.
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# Roadmap
Direction, not promises. Two rules govern everything below (README
§Security has the long form):
- **Accidents, not adversaries.** New checks earn their place by
preventing a plausible mistake — stale state, a typo, a race — not by
closing a hypothetical attack from a friend.
- **Social, not mechanical.** New features earn their place by
encouraging people to work together in a terminal, not by adding
machinery.
## Next — small, high value
- **`party knock <name>`** — an uninvited group member pings the host
via `write(1)`: "veg wants to join fiesta". `party list` already
shows invite-only parties; knock completes that loop. The feature
most likely to cause spontaneous pairing.
- **`party log`** — per-party transcript via `tmux pipe-pane` into the
per-party dir (group-readable so every attendee can grab a copy);
`party log --stop` ends it. "What did we do last night?" for
collectives, and the audit trail human+AI co-work needs.
- **`party clean`** — remove the caller's own crash leftovers (dirs
they own whose socket is dead), turning the manual `rm -rf` recovery
in host's error message into a verb.
## Later
- **Group ergonomics** — the default `party` group needs root and a
relog before anyone's first party. On boxes where everyone already
shares a group, `host` could offer (or default to) the caller's
primary group when `party` doesn't exist. Fits the trust model;
costs a little existence-confidentiality.
- **One liveness primitive** — fold `is_party_alive` into
`party_conn_state`; two concepts where one would do.
- **Matrix** — live validation on NetBSD and DragonFly; one
interactive attach/role/switch pass per release (automated coverage
is all non-interactive).
## Resist — by design, not by neglect
- **No network transport.** Same-host is the perimeter; beyond it lies
reinventing ssh.
- **No per-pane ACLs.** tmux can't enforce them; faking it with hooks
would be a leaky abstraction. Document the limitation instead.
- **No config files, no plugin system, no ACL syscalls.** One POSIX
file that runs on a 30-year spread of UNIXes is the identity; the
2026-04 simplification that removed per-OS ACL dispatch is not to be
unwound.
- **Watch the file size.** Heavy why-comments are a feature; feature
growth that pushes the single file far past its current size is not.