diff --git a/README.md b/README.md
index 1257579..35ba85e 100644
--- a/README.md
+++ b/README.md
@@ -95,7 +95,7 @@ The mechanism is identical everywhere: group ownership and mode bits plus `tmux
 
 The threat model is **accidents, not adversaries**. `party` runs where everyone already shares the box, so the ownership and symlink gates in front of destructive operations (`close`'s directory removal, moderation) are there so a stale roster, a typo, or two racing `party host` invocations can't remove or hijack the wrong thing: that the same checks would also stop a malicious group member is a side effect, not the design goal. New checks should earn their place by preventing a plausible *mistake*, not by closing a hypothetical attack from a friend.
 
-Three honest caveats, with the full detail in `man party`:
+The honest caveats, with the full detail in `man party`:
 
 - On ACL-enabled filesystems (ZFS, HFS+/APFS), inherited ACLs can override the mode bits, so the FS gate is best-effort. The auth gate still holds.
 - A party's *existence* is not hidden the way *attaching* is. That confidentiality rides on the FS gate.