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style: no em-dash in test comments

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veg 2026-09-21 09:48:23 +00:00
parent 120fed8cb4
commit 521777215d
6 changed files with 21 additions and 21 deletions
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2
tests/50-host.bats
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@ -70,7 +70,7 @@ party_rec() { printf '%s/party-%s:%s.d/roster\n' "$PARTY_SOCKET_DIR" "$USER" "$1
@test "party close rejects bad names" { @test "party close rejects bad names" {
# Previous incarnation of this test edited HOST_USER in the roster # Previous incarnation of this test edited HOST_USER in the roster
# file and expected close to refuse. That's no longer the trust # file and expected close to refuse. That's no longer the trust
# model — host identity is anchored on dir ownership, not file # model: host identity is anchored on dir ownership, not file
# content (commit 94befac), so editing HOST_USER is a no-op. # content (commit 94befac), so editing HOST_USER is a no-op.
# The "not the host" path now tests as: another user owns the dir, # The "not the host" path now tests as: another user owns the dir,
# which we can't fake without root. Coverage for the symlink and # which we can't fake without root. Coverage for the symlink and

2
tests/60-list-join-leave.bats
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@ -47,7 +47,7 @@ EOF
# Cross-user discovery regression. Earlier revisions of party_conn_state # Cross-user discovery regression. Earlier revisions of party_conn_state
# probed the PID with `kill -0`, which returns EPERM under POSIX semantics # probed the PID with `kill -0`, which returns EPERM under POSIX semantics
# when the caller can't signal the target — illumos, all BSDs, and macOS # when the caller can't signal the target: illumos, all BSDs, and macOS
# honor that, so guests couldn't discover parties hosted by other users # honor that, so guests couldn't discover parties hosted by other users
# on the same box. To simulate the foreign-uid case without privilege, # on the same box. To simulate the foreign-uid case without privilege,
# rewrite the roster's SERVER_PID to 1 (init/launchd, root-owned on every # rewrite the roster's SERVER_PID to 1 (init/launchd, root-owned on every

2
tests/90-notifications.bats
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@ -26,7 +26,7 @@ party_rec() { printf '%s/party-%s:%s.d/roster\n' "$PARTY_SOCKET_DIR" "$USER" "$1
sr=$(tmux -S "$sock" show-options -gv status-right) sr=$(tmux -S "$sock" show-options -gv status-right)
[[ "$sr" == *"who --short"* ]] [[ "$sr" == *"who --short"* ]]
# The #() body is executed with the tmux server's PATH, which need # The #() body is executed with the tmux server's PATH, which need
# not contain an installed `party` — the widget must pin the absolute # not contain an installed `party`: the widget must pin the absolute
# path of the script that hosted the party. # path of the script that hosted the party.
[[ "$sr" == "party: #('/"* ]] [[ "$sr" == "party: #('/"* ]]
} }

26
tests/95-stub-roundtrip.bats
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@ -113,7 +113,7 @@ party_rec() { printf '%s/party-%s:%s.d/roster\n' "$PARTY_SOCKET_DIR" "$USER" "$1
} }
@test "host --group <name> records the chosen group in the roster" { @test "host --group <name> records the chosen group in the roster" {
# The stub doesn't care which group we pick — exercise the path that # The stub doesn't care which group we pick: exercise the path that
# plumbs --group through to the GROUP= field. Use the caller's primary # plumbs --group through to the GROUP= field. Use the caller's primary
# group so chgrp succeeds. # group so chgrp succeeds.
primary=$(id -gn) primary=$(id -gn)
@ -130,7 +130,7 @@ party_rec() { printf '%s/party-%s:%s.d/roster\n' "$PARTY_SOCKET_DIR" "$USER" "$1
@test "host with --group works without any pre-existing shared install dir" { @test "host with --group works without any pre-existing shared install dir" {
# Regression: the old layout required /tmp/roster to be installed at # Regression: the old layout required /tmp/roster to be installed at
# mode 1770 g=$TMUX_PARTY_GROUP at install time. The new layout has # mode 1770 g=$TMUX_PARTY_GROUP at install time. The new layout has
# nothing of the sort — every party is self-contained under PARTY_SOCKET_DIR. # nothing of the sort: every party is self-contained under PARTY_SOCKET_DIR.
# Confirm `party host --group` succeeds with a clean sandbox that # Confirm `party host --group` succeeds with a clean sandbox that
# never had a shared roster directory. # never had a shared roster directory.
primary=$(id -gn) primary=$(id -gn)
@ -165,7 +165,7 @@ party_rec() { printf '%s/party-%s:%s.d/roster\n' "$PARTY_SOCKET_DIR" "$USER" "$1
@test "host party_dir ends at mode 0750 even with permissive umask" { @test "host party_dir ends at mode 0750 even with permissive umask" {
# Regression for the umask race: with umask 0002, plain `mkdir` would # Regression for the umask race: with umask 0002, plain `mkdir` would
# produce 0775 until the later chmod 0750 closed the window. mkdir -m # produce 0775 until the later chmod 0750 closed the window. mkdir -m
# 0700 in cmd_host removes the window entirely — and the postcondition # 0700 in cmd_host removes the window entirely, and the postcondition
# is still 0750. # is still 0750.
( umask 0002 && "$PARTY_BIN" host umasked ) ( umask 0002 && "$PARTY_BIN" host umasked )
party_dir="$PARTY_SOCKET_DIR/party-$USER:umasked.d" party_dir="$PARTY_SOCKET_DIR/party-$USER:umasked.d"
@ -282,7 +282,7 @@ EOF
# tmux must not have been touched: the recorder log has nothing for # tmux must not have been touched: the recorder log has nothing for
# this party. # this party.
! grep -q "kill-server" "$TMUX_LOG" ! grep -q "kill-server" "$TMUX_LOG"
# Symlink and victim contents both intact — we did not chase the # Symlink and victim contents both intact: we did not chase the
# symlink to delete the attacker's tree. # symlink to delete the attacker's tree.
[ -L "$party_dir" ] [ -L "$party_dir" ]
[ -d "$victim" ] [ -d "$victim" ]
@ -290,7 +290,7 @@ EOF
} }
@test "host warns when PARTY_SOCKET_DIR is not group/world readable" { @test "host warns when PARTY_SOCKET_DIR is not group/world readable" {
# The sandbox parent is mode 0700 — trustworthy but undiscoverable to # The sandbox parent is mode 0700, trustworthy but undiscoverable to
# invitees. cmd_host should accept it (validator is happy) but emit # invitees. cmd_host should accept it (validator is happy) but emit
# a warning so the host notices before sending invites. # a warning so the host notices before sending invites.
run "$PARTY_BIN" host noreach run "$PARTY_BIN" host noreach
@ -556,7 +556,7 @@ STUB
# Trap fired: kill-server invoked against the derived socket. # Trap fired: kill-server invoked against the derived socket.
grep -q "$party_dir/sock kill-server" "$TMUX_LOG" grep -q "$party_dir/sock kill-server" "$TMUX_LOG"
# Per-party dir is gone — no leftover roster, no leftover sock. # Per-party dir is gone: no leftover roster, no leftover sock.
[ ! -e "$party_dir" ] [ ! -e "$party_dir" ]
} }
@ -577,7 +577,7 @@ STUB
@test "host refuses leftover per-party dir without a roster" { @test "host refuses leftover per-party dir without a roster" {
# Simulate a prior incarnation that left a per-party dir behind with # Simulate a prior incarnation that left a per-party dir behind with
# no roster (the rollback trap couldn't fire — SIGKILL or panic). # no roster (the rollback trap couldn't fire: SIGKILL or panic).
# cmd_host's mkdir-as-lock acquisition will fail with EEXIST. We # cmd_host's mkdir-as-lock acquisition will fail with EEXIST. We
# deliberately do NOT auto-clean: the same code path triggers on a # deliberately do NOT auto-clean: the same code path triggers on a
# concurrent in-flight host attempt for the same name, and racing # concurrent in-flight host attempt for the same name, and racing
@ -592,7 +592,7 @@ STUB
[[ "$output" == *"already exists"* ]] [[ "$output" == *"already exists"* ]]
[[ "$output" == *"party clean"* ]] [[ "$output" == *"party clean"* ]]
# The leftover dir is untouched — proves we did not race-clean. # The leftover dir is untouched: proves we did not race-clean.
[ -d "$party_dir" ] [ -d "$party_dir" ]
[ -e "$party_dir/sock" ] [ -e "$party_dir/sock" ]
@ -626,7 +626,7 @@ EOF
} }
@test "roster_read rejects basename whose party name fails validate_party_name" { @test "roster_read rejects basename whose party name fails validate_party_name" {
# The basename glob (party-*:*.d) is permissive — names like '.' (basename # The basename glob (party-*:*.d) is permissive: names like '.' (basename
# party-USER:..d) match it. cmd_host's validate_party_name rejects '.' as # party-USER:..d) match it. cmd_host's validate_party_name rejects '.' as
# a reserved name; roster_read runs the same check on read so a forged # a reserved name; roster_read runs the same check on read so a forged
# dir whose basename derives an illegal name can't pass. # dir whose basename derives an illegal name can't pass.
@ -649,7 +649,7 @@ EOF
} }
@test "cmd_list skips parties whose tmux list-clients fails" { @test "cmd_list skips parties whose tmux list-clients fails" {
# SERVER_PID liveness alone doesn't prove a party is real — init's PID 1 # SERVER_PID liveness alone doesn't prove a party is real: init's PID 1
# always passes, and a non-tmux daemon (or `nc -lU`) can hold a real # always passes, and a non-tmux daemon (or `nc -lU`) can hold a real
# AF_UNIX socket. cmd_list must run list-clients and treat non-zero as # AF_UNIX socket. cmd_list must run list-clients and treat non-zero as
# "not a real party," skipping the entry rather than reporting it with # "not a real party," skipping the entry rather than reporting it with
@ -730,7 +730,7 @@ STUB
# resolver. A roster can have a live SERVER_PID (PID reuse, init's pid 1) # resolver. A roster can have a live SERVER_PID (PID reuse, init's pid 1)
# and an [ -S ]-passing socket (planted via `nc -lU`) yet not be a real # and an [ -S ]-passing socket (planted via `nc -lU`) yet not be a real
# tmux server. party_conn_state must probe list-clients on every resolver, # tmux server. party_conn_state must probe list-clients on every resolver,
# not just cmd_list — otherwise `party join # not just cmd_list, otherwise `party join
# imposter` would resolve to the imposter and try to attach. # imposter` would resolve to the imposter and try to attach.
legit_dir="$PARTY_SOCKET_DIR/party-$USER:legit2.d" legit_dir="$PARTY_SOCKET_DIR/party-$USER:legit2.d"
mkdir -p "$legit_dir" && chmod 0750 "$legit_dir" mkdir -p "$legit_dir" && chmod 0750 "$legit_dir"
@ -785,7 +785,7 @@ STUB
# cmd_host MUST require server-access at runtime, not just in the # cmd_host MUST require server-access at runtime, not just in the
# README. tmux < 3.3 doesn't support the command, and silently # README. tmux < 3.3 doesn't support the command, and silently
# swallowing its failure (the prior behavior) would degrade the auth # swallowing its failure (the prior behavior) would degrade the auth
# gate to nothing — group members with FS access could attach without # gate to nothing: group members with FS access could attach without
# being invited. # being invited.
cat > "$PARTY_TMUX" <<'STUB' cat > "$PARTY_TMUX" <<'STUB'
#!/bin/sh #!/bin/sh
@ -804,7 +804,7 @@ case "$*" in
echo "$FAKE_SERVER_PID" echo "$FAKE_SERVER_PID"
;; ;;
*"server-access "*) *"server-access "*)
# Simulate tmux < 3.3 — command unknown. # Simulate tmux < 3.3: command unknown.
echo "unknown command: server-access" >&2 echo "unknown command: server-access" >&2
exit 1 exit 1
;; ;;

8
tests/96-unauthorized.bats
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@ -3,7 +3,7 @@
# Uninvited-guest semantics. tmux >= 3.3 answers a non-allowlisted # Uninvited-guest semantics. tmux >= 3.3 answers a non-allowlisted
# user's connection with "access not allowed" on stderr and EXIT 0 # user's connection with "access not allowed" on stderr and EXIT 0
# (verified live on 3.3a and 3.5a with two real users), for every # (verified live on 3.3a and 3.5a with two real users), for every
# command — including has-session, which then reports any target as # command, including has-session, which then reports any target as
# existing. Exit-code-based checks therefore misclassified # existing. Exit-code-based checks therefore misclassified
# "unauthorized" as "authorized": party status reported uninvited # "unauthorized" as "authorized": party status reported uninvited
# members as joined, party leave silently "succeeded", and party list # members as joined, party leave silently "succeeded", and party list
@ -28,7 +28,7 @@ STUB
# Plant a live-looking party dir + roster. Ownership is ours (bats # Plant a live-looking party dir + roster. Ownership is ours (bats
# can't fake a foreign uid without root), so cmd_status will also see # can't fake a foreign uid without root), so cmd_status will also see
# this fixture as "hosting" — that's orthogonal to the joined/leave # this fixture as "hosting": that's orthogonal to the joined/leave
# misreporting under test. # misreporting under test.
ensure_party_dir "$USER" fiesta ensure_party_dir "$USER" fiesta
d="$PARTY_SOCKET_DIR/party-$USER:fiesta.d" d="$PARTY_SOCKET_DIR/party-$USER:fiesta.d"
@ -88,7 +88,7 @@ STUB
@test "read-only invitee joining active falls back to passive with a notice" { @test "read-only invitee joining active falls back to passive with a notice" {
# tmux refuses new-session from a read-only client ("client is # tmux refuses new-session from a read-only client ("client is
# read-only", exit 1 — verified 3.3a/3.5a), so an active join for an # read-only", exit 1, verified 3.3a/3.5a), so an active join for an
# -r invitee died mid-command under set -eu. cmd_join must detect the # -r invitee died mid-command under set -eu. cmd_join must detect the
# R flag on its own ACL line and attach passive instead. The unquoted # R flag on its own ACL line and attach passive instead. The unquoted
# STUB delimiter is deliberate: $USER expands at write time, \$* at # STUB delimiter is deliberate: $USER expands at write time, \$* at
@ -110,7 +110,7 @@ STUB
@test "read-only invitee (U,R) flag format also falls back to passive" { @test "read-only invitee (U,R) flag format also falls back to passive" {
# tmux refuses new-session from a read-only client ("client is # tmux refuses new-session from a read-only client ("client is
# read-only", exit 1 — verified 3.3a/3.5a), so an active join for an # read-only", exit 1, verified 3.3a/3.5a), so an active join for an
# -r invitee died mid-command under set -eu. cmd_join must detect the # -r invitee died mid-command under set -eu. cmd_join must detect the
# R flag on its own ACL line and attach passive instead. The unquoted # R flag on its own ACL line and attach passive instead. The unquoted
# STUB delimiter is deliberate: $USER expands at write time, \$* at # STUB delimiter is deliberate: $USER expands at write time, \$* at

2
tests/helpers.bash
View file

@ -69,7 +69,7 @@ require_party_group() {
|| skip "user not in group '$g'; run: sudo usermod -aG $g $USER && relog" || skip "user not in group '$g'; run: sudo usermod -aG $g $USER && relog"
} }
# Print one username per line for users in group $1 — both supplementary # Print one username per line for users in group $1: both supplementary
# members (4th /etc/group field) and primary-group members (passwd gid # members (4th /etc/group field) and primary-group members (passwd gid
# match). Linux / illumos / FreeBSD / OpenBSD use getent(1); macOS has # match). Linux / illumos / FreeBSD / OpenBSD use getent(1); macOS has
# no getent and stores users in Directory Services, so fall back to # no getent and stores users in Directory Services, so fall back to